Evaluating the WHO Pandemic Agreement: Key Achievements and Major Shortcomings

After more than three years and thirteen rounds of negotiations, the Pandemic Agreement was agreed on 16 April 2025 and adopted by the World Health Assembly on 19 May 2025. The need for such an agreement is evident as questions surrounding future pandemics more certainly center around when, rather than “if;” however, many have said that the new agreement does not go far enough and lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic remain ignored.

Achievements

Multilateralism

The Pandemic Agreement is indeed historic, representing only the second legally binding treaty in the history of the WHO after 2003’s  WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC).  The negotiators accomplished this with the notable absence of the US, who indicated their intention to withdraw from the WHO earlier this year, despite playing a major role prior to the Trump administration’s announcement.  Experts such as Prof. Gostin have stated that the absence of the US may have mobilized other countries such as the European bloc to complete the treaty.[1] Many have heralded this as an achievement of multilateralism, with Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director General of the WHO stating that “demonstrated that multilateralism is alive and well, and that in our divided world, nations can still work together to find common ground, and a shared response to shared threats.”[2]  

The accomplishment of the pandemic accord builds confidence in the WHO institution and its effectiveness, despite the prolonged negotiations.  It also demonstrates the ability of the WHO to respond to member state demands and work within evolving geopolitical dynamics, essential features of a functioning system that can respond effectively to future pandemics.

Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing

Many agree the draft agreement’s focus on pathogen access and benefit sharing is beneficial to pandemic preparedness.  This feature allows pharmaceutical companies to be granted access to pathogen samples and genomic sequences for the development of drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics in exchange for more equitable sharing of those health tools during a pandemic. Article 12 of the Agreement provides that the participating manufacturers will make at least 20% of their real time production of vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics available to the WHO, with 10% of the real time production to the WHO as a donation and the remaining 10% to be reserved at affordable prices to the WHO. Distribution of the vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics will be based on public health risk and need, with emphasis on developing countries and the newly created Global Supply Chain and Logistics Network.[3] However, there will be negotiations on the mechanism for sharing pathogen samples and genomic sequences for at least one year. [4]  This development should be treated as a cautious success until the details for the PABS mechanism are finalized. Nonetheless, it represents a significant advance in pandemic preparedness, considering how equity was championed by many developing countries.

Shortcomings

Enforcement Mechanisms

Some critics of the pandemic treaty have pointed out issues surrounding the lack of enforcement power. Some of this criticism is ill placed. While the WHO is uniquely suited to manage pandemics, much of its power is epistemic. It is not a police agency, and member states will not agree to compromise their own sovereignty. As such, attempts to cede sovereignty by including certain mandates are a non-starter for any agreement.  However, given the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic, the lack of enforcement mechanisms may leave developing countries particularly vulnerable. [5]

Human Rights Protections

Among the chief complaints is that the equity provisions went from mandates to voluntary within the final negotiated text. Relatedly, weakening of explicit human rights provisions Experts point to the weakening of explicit human rights commitments within the text of the Pandemic Agreement as a failure of the treaty negotiations. The failure to include human rights protections such as right to health and right to benefit from scientific progress, again threatens the lessons learned from COVID-19. [6]

Conclusion

Despite the shortcomings of the new Pandemic Agreement, it represents an important step in pandemic preparedness. However, the next pandemic, whenever that occurs, will be its true test.  

[1] https://www.science.org/content/article/global-pandemic-treaty-finalized-without-us-victory-multilateralism

[2] https://www.who.int/news/item/16-04-2025-who-member-states-conclude-negotiations-and-make-significant-progress-on-draft-pandemic-agreement

[3] Article 13, Pandemic Agreement https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA78/A78_R1-en.pdf

[4] https://www.science.org/content/article/global-pandemic-treaty-finalized-without-us-victory-multilateralism

[5] https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/pandemic-treaty-without-teeth-will-leave-africa-and-world-exposed?utm_source=thinkglobalhealth&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=TGH%202025May23&utm_term=TGH

[6] https://www.icj.org/icj-and-other-human-rights-groups-draft-pandemic-treaty-fails-to-comply-with-human-rights/?utm_source=chatgpt.com